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Deidealization as a topic in its own right has attracted remarkably little philosophical inter-
est despite the extensive literature on idealization. One reason for this is the often implicit
assumption that idealization and deidealization are, potentially at least, reversible processes.
We question this assumption by analyzing the challenges of deidealization within a menu
of four broad categories: deidealizing as recomposing, deidealizing as reformulating, de-
idealizing as concretizing, and deidealizing as situating. On closer inspection, models turn
out much more inflexible than the reversal thesis would have us believe, and deidealization
emerges as a creative part of modeling.1. Introduction. Implicit in the philosophical notion of idealization is a cer-
tain idea of model construction: that models are arrived at, among other ways,
through a process, or processes, of idealizing. The presence of such a process
becomes manifest as soon as the question of deidealization is raised. Namely,
idealization and deidealization are assumed to be potentially reversible pro-
cesses. Models are thought by philosophers of science to be built by making
use of processes of distortion, omission, abstraction, and approximation that
are variously included in the category of idealization, depending on the philo-
sophical theory in question. The different theories tend to assume that the ide-
alizing features that make models less accurate representations of their targets
can be, at least in principle, reversed, setting up deidealization as an opposite
process (or set of processes) to that of idealization. Consequently, one central
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All ucisely the desirability of deidealization—thus giving deidealization a pivotal
role in distinguishing between different notions of idealization (Nowak 1992,
2000; Weisberg 2007; Elliott-Graves and Weisberg 2014).
Yet, despite the extensive literature on idealization and despite the fact that
the question of deidealization proves critical for many accounts of idealization,
deidealization as a topic in its own right has not succeeded in attracting much
explicit philosophical interest. In this article, we zoom in on this lacuna and
study the challenges modelers face when attempting to deidealize their mod-
els. We have grouped such challenges within four broad categories: deidealizing
as recomposing, deidealizing as reformulating, deidealizing as concretizing,
and deidealizing as situating. Analyzing these challenges suggests that the idea
of deidealization as a reversal process is both overly simplified and frequently
misguided.
Our account, by taking the processes of deidealization seriously, highlights
certain representational, conceptual, and methodological complexities of mod-
eling that are often overlooked in treatments that focus only on idealization.
Deidealization is crucial for different kinds of attempts to apply models to the
world—by empirical use with statistics, in designing experiments, or in mak-
ing arguments about concrete events. Such attempts unquestionably involve
deidealization. But deidealization is frequently involved also in the use of mod-
els for theorizing in different contexts and different ways. In what follows, we
analyze the processes of deidealization by drawing on examples from eco-
nomics and the existing literature in the philosophy of economics on model
application problems (e.g., Boumans 2005; Alexandrova 2006; Reiss 2008;
Svetlova 2013). Concentrating on one discipline provides a more synoptic
view than a collection of examples drawn from a multitude of disciplines.
Economics provides, furthermore, a good subject for studying deidealization
by bestowing a rich repository, and relatively long history, of examples of ide-
alization and deidealization. Also, and equally importantly, economics as a
discipline faces the expectations of both policy makers and citizens, making
deidealization of economic models both habitual and challenging.
2. What Idealization Implies about Deidealization. It is generally agreed
among philosophers of science that most if not all models involve idealiza-
tions.1 Being idealized, models give us inexact, partial, inaccurate, or distorted
depictions of reality, and because of such limitations, one influential defense
of idealization is provided precisely by the possibility of deidealization. Ac-
cording to this defense, as a science ‘advances’, the various simplifications and
distortions effected by idealizations will be corrected, thus making the the-
oretical representations more concrete or realistic (e.g., McMullin 1985; Nowak
2000). In these discussions, one can notice a subtle slide between the notion1. We are focusing on formal models, but much of our discussion also applies to empir-
ical and material models.
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NO EASY REVERSALS 643of idealization as a process of model formation (by distorting, simplifying, or
abstracting, etc.) and idealization as a quality of models (models are simple,
inaccurate or distorted, mathematically formulated, etc.). This ambiguity, be-
tween whether one is talking about the process or an outcome object called
‘the model’, serves to hide the implicit assumption that models gain the qual-
ity of being idealized because of the processes that formed them.
Earlier discussion was more explicit. Nowak (e.g., 1992, 2000) offers a
classic example of the supposed reversibility of the processes of both ideali-
zation and deidealization, with the deidealizing move being called concreti-
zation. In Nowak’s view, scientific breakthroughs were brought about by the
method of idealization that seeks to set apart, and study, the dependencies be-
tween the most relevant magnitudes or essential components. He analyzed
the work of, for example, Galileo, Darwin, and Marx, and claimed that the suc-
cess of these theories was due to their proficient use of idealization. How-
ever, the application of an idealized theory would require a return from the
ideal world to the real-world phenomena through the procedure of concret-
ization. By eliminating step by step the idealizing conditions, more realistic
statements could be achieved. For Nowak, this concretization process is usu-
ally completed by approximation: “Normally, after introducing some correc-
tions the procedure of approximation is applied. That is, all idealizing condi-
tions are removed and their joint influence is assessed as responsible for the
deviations up to a certain threshold ε” (Nowak 1992, 12). In other words, Nowak
assumed that in the mature natural sciences the approximative structure even-
tually replaces the idealized structure.
In these accounts, idealization, conceived as a process, was considered to
cover various different kinds of strategies of simplifying, of leaving aside some
components, and of abstraction into mathematical form.2 In the more recent
discussion, these terminologies have changed their sense such that now a clear
distinction is often made between idealization and abstraction. While ideal-
izations are thought to distort the features of the (real-world) target system
in the simplification process, abstraction has been interpreted in terms of sub-
traction, that is, of omitting some of these features, or causal factors (e.g., Cart-
wright 1989; Nowak 2000; Jones 2005; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Levy and Bechtel
2013). ‘Abstractions’, then, are thought to give veridical, although partial, rep-
resentations, whereas ‘idealizations’ depict something differently from what is
known, or assumed to be, the case. Yet, even in this more articulated frame-
work, the processual character of idealization is preserved. For example, Levy
(2018) addresses the “process/product ambiguity” with respect to idealization,
claiming that in understanding idealization the intentions of the modeler and2. The classic starting point is usually considered to be McMullin (1985). Nowak (2000),
however, does distinguish between idealization as distortion and abstraction as a concep-
tualizing move (see sec. 3.3) in his application of the dialectical method to the question of
idealization.
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All uthe process of model construction are crucial; idealization involves “a delib-
erate introduction of falsehood into a representation.”3
The distortions introduced by idealization have been motivated and jus-
tified on different grounds yet hinge simultaneously on the possibility/desir-
ability of deidealization.Weisberg (Weisberg 2007; Elliott-Graves andWeisberg
2014) has distinguished between ‘Galilean idealization’ (which relies on the
possibility of deidealization) and ‘minimalist idealization’ (which does not and
so has to be justified on different grounds).4 The pivotal role deidealization oc-
cupies within this distinction becomes apparent once we consider Galilean and
minimalist idealizations a bit more closely.
Galilean idealizations are primarily introduced to make a model tractable
for computational and other purposes, the ultimate goal being the deidealization
of the model. The simple, hypothetical model, arrived at by idealization, is in
the subsequent research rendered more accurate by deidealizing it. Thus, Gal-
ilean idealizations are thought to be corrigible in that they are supposed to be,
at least in principle, reversible by adding back real-world details and correct-
ing the distorted features.5 From the epistemic point of view, however, as Bat-
terman (2009, 445) points out, there is something paradoxical about such strat-
egies of idealization, as the justification of idealizations is due to their (future)
eliminability.
In minimalist idealization—according to Weisberg—simple models are not
to be deidealized because this will not increase their explanatory or epistemic
value. Batterman calls such a minimalist notion of idealization “the non-
traditional view” and claims that “the adding of details with the goal of ‘im-
proving’ the minimal model is self-defeating—such improvements are illusory”
(2009, 430). Weisberg (Weisberg 2007; Elliott-Graves and Weisberg 2014)
considers mainly the case in which the minimal idealized model is thought
to contain only the “core causal features that give rise to a phenomenon of
interest” (Elliott-Graves and Weisberg 2014, 178). This idea is articulated
in the work of Strevens (2008, 2016), who puts forth a causal difference-
making approach, where idealization serves to distinguish between difference-
makers and non-difference-makers. The latter are set aside through assign-
ing to the variables representing them extreme or default values. However,
Batterman (Batterman 2000; Batterman and Rice 2014) explicitly discards the
idea that minimalist idealization depends on the assumption that models are3. Levy (2018) also mentions “concretization” but does not expand on this theme.
4. Weisberg (2007) also introduces a third kind of idealization: the multiple models
idealization.
5. Consequently, Galilean idealizations have also been called tractability assumptions
(e.g., Hindriks 2005). For McMullin, however, Galilean idealization does not only boil
down to making the representation more tractable. He points out that for Galileo ideal-
ization also imposed order “in an attempt to grasp the real world from which the ideal-
ization takes the origin” (McMullin 1985, 248).
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NO EASY REVERSALS 645explanatory by virtue of being able to isolate some core causal factors. Bat-
terman underlines the positive explanatory role of idealizations: they may
demonstrate what details are irrelevant instead of merely being used to iso-
late the difference-makers from the irrelevant features and assigning the ex-
planatory work to the difference-makers.
Despite these differences in accounts of minimalist idealization, Weisberg’s
proposal effectively captures a distinction that had already been built into the
discussion of idealization and also the centrality of the question of deidealiza-
tion for different strategies of idealization. Further distinctions proposed also
serve to highlight this centrality point. Sklar (2000) has distinguished between
controllable and uncontrollable idealizations in discussing when scientists
are justified in isolating the system they are studying from the interferences
of other factors and assuming them to be negligible. In the case of controllable
idealizations, the theory, or a background theory, informs scientists “in what
ways, and to what degree, the conclusions we reach about the idealized model
can be expected to diverge from the features we will find to hold experimen-
tally in the real system in the world” (Sklar 1993, 258). Sklar points out, how-
ever, that scientists do not always know how to compensate for such limit-style
idealizations, raising the question of how to legitimize such less tractable and
thus ‘uncontrollable’ idealizations (2000, 63). In a somewhat similar vein,
Elgin and Sober write about ‘harmless’ idealizations, where “a causal model
contains an idealization when it correctly describes some of the causal factors
at work, but falsely assumes that other factors that affect the outcome are
absent” (2002, 448). Such idealizations “are harmless if correcting them
wouldn’t make much difference in the predicted value of the effect variable”
(448).6
What interests us in these distinctions—Galilean idealization versus mini-
malist idealization, and uncontrolled versus controlled or harmless idealiza-
tion—is that they crucially depend, although in different ways, on the possi-
bility and desirability of deidealization in modeling. Galilean idealizations are
considered reversible and correctable by deidealization. Minimalist idealiza-
tions, however, dispense with deidealization on the assumption that such ide-
alizations could be either harmless or controllable, or deidealizing themwould
be explanatorily counterproductive. However, the texts presenting these dis-
tinctions rarely mention deidealization, let alone trying to articulate it. The sit-
uation is curious: How has a notion as central as deidealization escaped the
explicit attention of philosophers so far?
In what follows, we consider deidealization separately from the discus-
sion of idealization, in contrast to the major philosophical contributions on
idealization that have approached deidealization as if it were a relatively un-
interesting question, either conceptualizing it as a reversal or questioning its6. Elgin and Sober do not talk about harmful idealizations.
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All udesirability altogether. Even though the existent philosophical discussion on
(de)idealizationhas been orbiting around the questionof whether to deidealize or
not, it has not examined what deidealization entails and accomplishes in ac-
tual scientific practices. We focus instead on deidealization directly, drawing
some inspiration from the literature on model application that points toward
the complexities and wider functions of deidealization, as well as to the crea-
tive and constructive processes involved (e.g., Alexandrova 2006; Morgan
and Knuuttila 2012; Miyake 2015, along with this article). Deidealization
turns out to be central for the practice of modeling and illuminative of what
it encompasses.
3. The Deidealization Menu: Forms, Aims, and Heuristics. In order to
address deidealization on its own, freed from the traditional assumptions and
distinctions, we do not begin from the processes of idealization or even model
making but rather study how models are made usable in certain domains.
Models function for scientists as both representing devices and artifacts on
which experiments of a particular form—‘model experiments’—can be under-
taken. On the one hand, then, scientists use models to represent some system
of interest—real, hypothetical, or fictional—that they want to investigate. On
the other hand, scientists work with models to learn more about their perfor-
mance and implications. They treat models as experimentable, or explorative,
devices: they ask questions of them, manipulate them, and even ‘play’ with
them to study their properties and so, directly or indirectly, the possible targets
that they might be used to represent. Starting with these functions of models—
representing and experimenting—we see that scientists are engaged in a va-
riety of constructive activities when deidealizing.
Our analysis begins with greater emphasis on the experimentable qualities
of using models and moves toward greater emphasis on their representing
qualities. As we find, the idea of deidealization as reversal seems more apt—
perhaps surprisingly—when modeling work is considered in an analogy to
experimentation. Yet, the turn to representing issues shows that the idea of
deidealization as a set of reversals is very difficult to sustain. Of course, the
two functions of models can never be fully disentangled. The conceptual dis-
tinction between the two functions furnishes, however, a handy analytic tool
for the introduction of the processes of deidealization under four categories:
(i) recomposing, (ii) reformulating, (iii) concretizing, and (iv) situating. Re-
composing refers to the reconfiguration of the parts of the model with respect
to the causal structure of the world; the supposed links between the parts of
the model and real elements, or causal forces, highlight the experimentable
qualities of models. Reformulating and concretizing deal more directly with
the issues of representing in focusing on the two different sides of the abstract-
ness of models: their symbolic and conceptual formulation. Finally, situating
addresses the applicability of models to particular situations, either in the real
world or in theorizing. It is concerned with not just how a model can be deideal-This content downloaded from 158.143.237.079 on September 30, 2019 03:34:33 AM
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enhance their use in theorizing, also stressing their mobility across different
uses and disciplines. The proposed classification, and the associated labels, aim
to render visible the positive, creative, and use-oriented aspects of deidealiza-
tion and not just the challenges involved.
3.1. Deidealizing as Recomposing. One primary use of models is in-
vestigative; they are vehicles for gaining new knowledge.When scientists come
to use models for investigative purposes, they treat them as experimentable
objects, without of course waiving their representational status. This points
us to the quality of models as experimental setups: simple and focused situ-
ations in which a very small number of causes or elements are considered and
all other elements/causes are ‘shielded off’ outside the model’s boundaries.
This is consistent with minimalist modelers’ viewpoint, but the point we make
here is that models are not simplified representations because scientists nec-
essarily believe in the simplicity of the world but because these assumptions
are needed for models to function as experimentable devices. As for any lab-
oratory experimental setup, a modeler focuses on the relevant small number
of factors/elements, and shields the setup from other factors including distur-
bances (Mäki 2005; Morgan 2005).
But to what extent does an analogy between modeling and experimental
practice imply that such ‘shielding off’ idealizations could be undone in a
reverse process of deidealization? To reverse the (quasi)experimental setup of
a model is no simple task; it would not be in the laboratory either. One way
to appreciate the difficulties of this set of deidealization processes is to think
of them as reversals of the various ceteris paribus conditions. They are con-
ditions that generally remain implicit rather than explicit. Boumans (1999b) has
argued that there are three separate conditions here, not just one. Following
his division, such processes of deidealization entail adding back (a) those fac-
tors that are normally assumed absent yet that do have an influence (i.e., the
ceteris absentibus factors); (b) those factors normally assumed of so little weight
that they can be neglected in the idealized model (the ceteris neglectis condi-
tion); and (c) variability in those factors that are present but whose effect in
the model is neutral as they are assumed to be held constant (i.e., the ceteris
paribus factors).
There are practical difficulties in using the reversal processes for ceteris
absentibus factors, as the set of likely causal factors to be taken back into ac-
count might be very large, not able to be fully specified, or dependent in com-
plex ways on one another. If so, adding back these other causal factors will
alter the existing contents of the model.7 Such a model cannot be simply de-
isolated; it can only be recomposed by knowledge of the rest of the elements.7. An early philosophical discussion of adding back in such omitted factors is found in
Hausman (1990).
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All uAnd just as the world is unlikely to be neatly decomposable, neither is the
model.
Ceteris neglectis, in turn, concerns things so small that they can be ne-
glected—providing, as we have seen, one important defense of minimal mod-
eling strategy. But even if small individually, when added together, the ne-
glected factors might make a difference to the model in application.
Within the context of economics, reversing the ceteris paribus conditions
(those that hold things constant) has been more discussed than relaxing the
two earlier conditions. Models have often embedded assumptions that have
been made to smooth out variety to create stability and so enforce homogene-
ity, and it is not always obvious how that squashed-out variety is to be re-
constituted. This might—for example—mean replacing distributions for av-
erages, replacing messy empirical values for simplified hypothetical values,
or bringing in time-dependent variations rather than assuming a static world.
Such reversing may include correcting factors that have been set to ideal values
for which there is no evidence of any real values, either because of absence
of knowledge or because there are no possible equivalent deidealized values.
But notice that deidealization may involve something easy to do that compli-
cates the model only a little, such as replacing average values by probability
distributions, or something very different such as replacing perfect knowledge
with partial ignorance.
The ultimate problem of laboratory experimental work is that the world
in the test tube is so restricted and isolated that it cannot immediately and
easily be fitted up to be usable in the world—think only of the incredible sci-
entific investment in pharmacology to test whether a synthesized ‘cure’ devel-
oped in the lab will work in patients. But the problems of model experiments
extend beyond that and are also of a different nature—an experiment in the
lab is not the same as an experiment on a model (see Morgan 2003, 2012).
Models are usually accomplished by representing the system to be investi-
gated in a different medium than their real-world target systems (e.g., a real-life
economic action is represented in mathematical form). These differences in
material media take us to the realm of representing. The issues involved con-
cern both the constraints of the representational languages used that become
visible in the attempts to reformulate the model (sec. 3.2) and those of con-
cretizing the theoretical concepts (sec. 3.3).
3.2. Deidealizing as Reformulating. The diversity of scientific models
is astounding; they are formulated in many different modes of representation
in order to convey their content. These representational means impose their
own constraints on modeling that can be both enabling and limiting (Knuuttila
2011). If the model is diagrammatic, for example, it offers certain possibili-
ties and imposes certain limitations on what can be represented, and these will
be different if the model form is algebraic or geometric. There are three majorThis content downloaded from 158.143.237.079 on September 30, 2019 03:34:33 AM
se subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
NO EASY REVERSALS 649considerations here: integration issues, tractability issues, and translation is-
sues, all of which provide challenges to any process of deidealization.
Models must hold together; there must be some form of integration, a pro-
cess of giving overall form to a model. Such integration may be achieved
quite subtly, by what Boumans (1999a) aptly calls ‘mathematical molding’ that
amounts to, for example, making mathematical formulation choices that inte-
grate a set of elements in a certain way. Mathematical molding is a central fea-
ture of the model, yet it might not be noticed or seen as such once the choices
have been made. These choices related to mathematization cannot often sim-
ply be ‘undone’: deidealization involves reformulating the model, taking into
account that the model might fall apart without that particular construction.
Integration operates as a strong constraint, but it is not always obvious
which side it is on: the side of idealization or deidealization. For example,
should the sequence of equations in a model embed a simultaneity require-
ment or be block recursive (modular)—a choice with very different conse-
quences for processes of deidealization, for the former cannot easily be taken
apart, where the latter can be. This particular problematic sits at the heart of
economics. In theoretical terms, it marks the difference between a statement
that the world is in a state of equilibrium in all markets at all points of time,
from the alternative view that the system only has a tendency to equilibrium.
It is a contrast that permeates both theoretical modeling and applied model-
ing. Economists may believe that the modular system best represents how
people plan and act, in a very complicated set of codependency relations that
are also time dependent—implying only a tendency toward equilibrium. In
principle, these relations could be unraveled within a model, but in practice
economists can only get aggregate data for such models at such wide inter-
vals that the application model must necessarily be written in a simultaneous
form and so as an equilibrium model (Morgan 1991). Even with the present
computing power, treating every individual in the market as a member of a si-
multaneous system is not easy. As in climate science modeling, this is more
than a big data problem; it is a complexity problem, and attempts to solve
it in economics may start from another direction (such as by agent-based
modeling).
These representing issues become intertwined with experimentability is-
sues when we recognize that models are built to be tractable. Frequently, this
is thought to mean merely setting certain variables to certain values (e.g., to
zero) in order to make the mathematics work easily. But it is often difficult to
know how many of those model assumptions could be translated back into
statements about real entities and processes. Alexandrova (2006) calls such
assumptions ‘derivation facilitators’ and asks whether it is more realistic for
agents to have discretely as opposed to continuously distributed valuations,
given that it is already questionablewhether people form their beliefs by draw-
ing a value from a probability distribution.This content downloaded from 158.143.237.079 on September 30, 2019 03:34:33 AM
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All uAt a granular level, then, it is difficult to see how one could easily tease
apart the individual assumptions of a model and deidealize them separately.
Indeed, according to Cartwright (1999), economic models are overconstrained,
by which she means that the modeled situation is constructed in order to yield
certain kinds of results. Morrison (2009) pays attention to this same feature
of mathematical abstractions in physics, claiming that they are needed to make
the model work.
Tractability of course impinges on the investigative function of models.
For example, economists’ infamous ‘overlapping generations’ model designed
to get at the relationships between consumption and savings in an economy
imagined a world of two generations, who work and save in their first period
and who use their savings to consume in retirement (see Hausman’s [1992]
analysis). The model relates the two ‘generations’ so that each new working
generation transfers resources to the current retired generation. Restricting the
model made it tractable; indeed, economists often begin with modeled worlds
that have only two dimensions (two consumers, two goods, or two factors of
production), for ease of the mathematics. Deidealizing to increase the number
of dimensions (e.g., an overlapping model of three generations: children, work-
ers, retirees) would make their models somewhat more realistic, of course,
but also more difficult to manage.
The process of deidealizing mathematical models may also involve trans-
lations, for different scientific uses may require a formulation that is more con-
venient for that particular use; that is, deidealizing may involve making a
choice of different representational modes, frequently a switch from one for-
mal language to another. Whatever formal language the model is presented
in, it cannot straightforwardly be translated into another formal language, for
both will likely have a different semantics and syntax. Even in those cases in
which the various mathematical versions of a model are ‘formally equivalent’,
implying easy switching between ‘equivalent’ formal representations, scien-
tists’ own subject-based understanding of, and use of, the model is likely to
be different (Vorms 2011; Morgan 2012). As an example, game theory in its
early years had three different representations, in three different mathemat-
ical formulations, to describe or instantiate game structures: a matrix struc-
ture of payoffs (which depicts the outcome of choices), a branching tree dia-
gram of possibilities (which depict the decision process of choosing), and a
spatial solution set (depicting the set of possible solutions; Luce and Raiffa
1957). These different formulations focused on different aspects of the rel-
evant game for different purposes, and they imply different processes of de-
idealization for use.
These difficulties of arriving at mathematical representations and holding
model elements together may explain in part the enormous success of some
mathematical formulations that are applied across different disciplines. Ex-
amples of such cross-disciplinary templates (Humphreys 2004) are generalThis content downloaded from 158.143.237.079 on September 30, 2019 03:34:33 AM
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ematical models as the Ising model and the Lotka-Volterra model or network
methods more generally, all of which have been applied to various problems
within economics. But, of course, deidealizing models built on cross-disciplinary
formal templates is problematic almost by definition since their application is
precisely based on the tractability of their particular syntactic configurations.
Moreover, the semantics are also important: the template needs to be trans-
lated from the theoretical framework of the source field to the new discipline,
as well as the new target, in question. Such translation typically involves con-
siderable theoretical effort. For example, it is not a trivial question how a for-
mal template designed for the phenomenon of ferromagnetism can be applied
to neural networks or peer pressure in socioeconomic systems (Knuuttila and
Loettgers 2014, 2016). Accordingly, many problems of translation point to
the issues faced by the attempt to concretize the concepts incorporated into
models.
3.3. Deidealizing as Concretizing. On the representing end of the spec-
trum, deidealizing involves (apart from reformulating) concretizing the con-
ceptual core of the model that may be needed for specific purposes in the-
orizing or in application. The idealized model is likely to embed a scientist’s
theoretical or conceptual commitments about either the system or the elements
of that system.While there has been some consideration of concept-formation
associated with modeling (e.g., Wartofsky 1968; Nersessian 2008), there has
been little on the problem of deidealizing those conceptual abstractions (ex-
cept for Nowak 1992, 2000). This means figuring out how such conceptual
abstractions about the system, or the elements in it, are made concrete; the
conceptual elements can be deidealized in different ways for different sites
and for different purposes.
The concept of an economy, the economy as a whole unit, has been made
concrete in many different ways, for example, as following a dynamic path
with cyclical oscillation in business cycle research; as a system that relates
all the inputs to all the outputs of each productive sector in ‘input-out analy-
sis’; or as a ‘macroeconomy’ that uses an accounting framework to examine
the relations of aggregates of consumption, investment, and so on. These dif-
ferent concretized models enable both reasoning and analysis at a theoretical
level and substantive empirical investigation.
‘Utility’ in turn, is concept more usually associated with the individual. It
is one of the most abstract and ubiquitous concepts used in economics, re-
ferring to the unobservable relationship between people and the goods that
they consume, and is the conceptual starting point for much of modern econom-
ics of individual behavior. There are various versions of the concept: focus-
ing on human need, or satisfaction, or enjoyment, and other relational notions.
It was developed in both textual and mathematical accounts in nineteenth-centuryThis content downloaded from 158.143.237.079 on September 30, 2019 03:34:33 AM
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deidealize it for specific and interventionist usages. One of many examples
has been in the development of quality-adjusted life years (QUALYS), in order
to capture subjective (i.e., patient-experienced) utility from extended life after
a medical intervention. These are not just processes of measurement oper-
ationalization, or of replacing the symbolic abstraction ‘U’ (for ‘utility’), but are
designed to fill in the content that would fit that conceptual abstraction ‘util-
ity’ to an equivalent substance, such as a quality of physical life (see sec. 3.5).
Being more concrete does not necessarily mean being more realistic or
accurate to any particular observable objects in the world, for the concretized
versions of these elements remain wedded to their conceptual framing. The
implications of concretization and the choices they require are well demon-
strated in Knight’s (1921) idealized interpretation of rational economic man.
The main ancestor of ‘rational economic man’ is usually taken to be ‘homo
economicus’, a character associated with John Stuart Mill’s mid-nineteenth-
century recipe for making economics a doable science: a wealth-seeking
miser who was nevertheless held back by his desires for luxury and dislike
of work. For Mill, this was an abstraction in two senses: these were the eco-
nomic characteristics of man to be found universally, but they were also un-
derstood conceptually. In the late nineteenth century, economists’ economic
man was portrayed as a consumer, seeking to maximize his utility according
to his preferences. In order to fully explore the rationality of that notion of
economic behavior, Knight endowed him with the virtues of perfect knowl-
edge and perfect foresight, so that his economic model man had no ignorance
of the present and no uncertainty about the future. The deidealization might
seem obvious—return uncertainty and lack of foresight to the account of man’s
behavior. Changing this assumption would not have been that straightforward
for Knight, who thought that lack of knowledge could be divided into two
chunks: risk, for which we could write down a probability distribution, and
genuine uncertainty about which we had no knowledge. Moreover, Knight
later described the implications of his assumptions to mean that his idealized
economic man was actually just a slot machine, with no reasoning power and
no intelligence (Morgan 2006). So, deidealizing Knight’s model would mean
introducing into it intelligence and reasoning power—a considerable prob-
lem in artificial intelligence, rather than a relatively contained, if difficult, task
of forecasting the economic future.
3.4. Deidealizing as Situating. Models, by virtue of their simplified,
ideal, or abstract qualities are not immediately applicable to any real concrete
situation in the world. This final important category refers to how models often
need to be explicitly situated back into the world—not just into the world in any
general sense but rather to be made usable for specific situations in the world.
One obvious place we can see this happening is when a simple mathematical
model used in theorizing is deidealized into a statistical model as it becomesThis content downloaded from 158.143.237.079 on September 30, 2019 03:34:33 AM
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mulating’, as in sec. 3.2) but of positive fitting to specific case situations.
For example, in economics in the early days of modeling markets for goods,
it was often assumed that statistical data could just be fitted to the equations,
for the data issues and measurement requirements were considered hardly
relevant to questions about the difference between corn and hog markets.
More recently, such economic modeling has taken the lessons from the prob-
lems of fitting models to data and begun to retrofit mathematical models so
that they are already geared toward the statistical data available (e.g., by em-
bedding the probability assumptions into the microchoice structures faced
by specific sets of individuals in economic labor markets).
The aim of deidealization as situating might be to locate a model in many
different but perhaps superficially similar specific sites, using either statistical
work or experimental work in lab or field. There is no reason to expect any
‘general’ deidealization, that is, one that will work everywhere. Any model
is likely to need a different deidealization for every different situation: time,
place, and topic. For example, poverty alleviation field experiments are usu-
ally based on some idealized model of behavior, which may be successfully
situated (deidealized) for application in a particular site but then often prove
not so successful when applied at another geographical site. The critical point
to note here is that models made relevant by deidealizing (situating) for just
one site may require idealizing again in some respects (i.e., desituating) and
then deidealizing again (resituating) in order to be relevant to another site (see
Cartwright 2012; Morgan 2014). Such processes, that is, the transfer of model-
based experimental designs from one site to another different site, bear re-
markable similarities with the transfer of model templates within and between
different disciplines that we discussed in section 3.2.
What these similarities between the application of model-based experi-
mental designs and the transfer of theoretical model templates show is that
deidealization as (re)situating is not just a challenge for applied work but
equally relevant for theoretical work in which models need to be partially
deidealized to situate them in a particular domain of theorizing. These pro-
cesses offer an equally open-ended and challenging agenda. A telling exam-
ple is provided by the supply-and-demand model, probably the most iconic
model in economics. This model in its original diagrammatic representation
was a simple cross or ‘scissors’ diagram of the supply-and-demand curves
cutting to capture the price and quantities exchanged in the market (there was
also a version in an algebraic format). Even before the end of the nineteenth
century, the diagram could be found in different versions as appropriate for
thin markets like that for race horses (where the demand and supply are both
limited, and value/price are difficult to determine) and for markets for spoiling
goods, like fish. That diagrammatic model was also developed at the same
time to picture different shapes for the supply curves as appropriate for dif-
ferent industrial structures on the supply side (monopolists or competitors).This content downloaded from 158.143.237.079 on September 30, 2019 03:34:33 AM
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priate for categories or kinds of things in the economic world. These forms of
deidealization create various generic models applicable to particular classes
of things, yet they still remain theorizing objects as direct offspring of the
original simpler model. Each one of them is formulated for kinds of markets,
yet no one version of the model applies to every market.
Although deidealizing the supply-and-demand model may seem to involve
steps toward more concrete accounts of markets, this does not amount to sim-
ply adding back factors or reversing assumptions or even reaching something
like a realistic account of markets. Rather, deidealization involves shaping the
ideal model in particular ways so that it becomes relevant to a subset of the
domain for both theorizing about and applications in those subdomains. Thus,
the deidealizing process may involve a move from abstract and general to a
still abstract, formal model appropriate for a generic class of phenomena or
to a level of model that is evidentiarily specific.
Sometimes this situating process involves radical change, particularly
changes in concepts. The supply-and-demand model had to be reinterpreted
when it wasmoved from themarket for goods to themarket for labor, prompt-
ing the concept of ‘voluntary unemployment’—that is, that the unemployed
chose unemployment because they valued leisure (regardless of whether the
choice was real in the sense that job vacancies were available). The appropri-
ation of the model in a very different domain required a reconceptualization
of the nature of unemployment. Once again, such processes of deidealization
maywell accompany the transfer of models for use between subfields within
a discipline or even between fields. Game theory models have been moved
from economics to apply in political science and evolutionary biology, but not
without changing conceptual interpretations and usages in these theoretical
domains, hinting toward the often neglected conceptual dimension in de-
idealization and underlining the close entanglement between concretizing and
situating.
3.5. The Deidealizing Menu: Example. Above we categorized deideal-
ization into four distinct processes related to the investigative and representa-
tional functions of models. Our analysis recognizes strong limitations in un-
derstanding deidealization as processes of reversal and suggests an alternative
way of thinking about it. Our four categories—of recomposing, reformulating,
concretizing, and situating—not only provide a useful analytical framework
but now offer an array, or menu, of processes of deidealization that can be
applied to a model according to the purposes at hand. These processes are
exemplified in figure 1 with respect to deidealizing the utility function to ar-
rive at the quality-adjusted life years (the specific QUALYS) relevant for a
given medical procedure.
Concretization.—The symbolic abstraction U stands for the conceptual
abstraction ‘utility’: the relation between a person and a ‘good’ understoodThis content downloaded from 158.143.237.079 on September 30, 2019 03:34:33 AM
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of a ‘good’ includes anything that a person values, such as a musical perfor-
mance or a hot shower or even a replacement limb, not just a box of choco-
lates or a cold drink). The notion of utility has been the subject of deep anal-
ysis and debate over a very long period. Its conceptual meaning has varied
over history and according to specific institutional and problem situations in
which it is used. At the current time, it primarily features as both a mathemat-
ical construct in equations and a theoretical entity with psychological implica-
tions underlying choice behavior. That theoretical entity refers to something
that economists believe “exist(s) independently of scientists and the scientific
conventions of the scientific community” (Cohen 1997, 178).
Given the ontological status of the notion of utility, economists have—
with a large investment in social research—made it concrete for specific pur-
poses in practical domains such as developing the notion and measurement
of QUALYS. And in this context, health-related utility functions can include
both needs and preferences.8 One can measure patients’ preferences with re-
spect to a particular treatment (e.g., how much does it contribute to improved
quality of life, convenience of use, fewer side effects) and also to their needs
(e.g., survival).
Reformulating.—Models are made for reasoning with. In this case, refor-
mulating them tomake themworkable instruments involvesmaking decisions,
for example, on the shapes of people’s utility curves, their choice behavior, andFigure 1. Deidealizing the utility function.8. Economists have followed two alternative strands of measurement according to two
notions of utility, one that frames thinking about utility valuations as stemming from indi-
viduals’ preferences and the other in terms of their needs (Cohen 1997).
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All uwhat it means to maximize. In the simple form shown in figure 1, it is not clear
what functional form themodel takes or what holds the elements together: the
model is not ready for use until these commitments are made. One of the com-
plications for these decisions is that in order to normalize experience across
a range of patients and medical interventions, QUALYS are valued from 0
to 1 (0 5 death, 15 full healthy life), and (arbitrarily set) interval scales are
used between these. The interval scale, still idealized, is useful for policy mak-
ing and administrators in allowing for comparative measurements, say, be-
tween different types of medical interventions. But, the presumption that in-
crements along the interval scale from 0 to 1 are all equivalent is problematic,
and such scales may not make much sense at the beginning and end of the
scale. All of these questions have implications for the way themodel is formu-
lated for theoretical reasoning and for practical usages.
Recomposing.—The valuations, and weighting of needs and preferences,
that people make about their utility in judging the future quality of their lives
under certain circumstances of less than perfect health (in QUALYS) will vary
with age, gender, nationality, family circumstances, and so on. So, if the econ-
omist’s purpose is to understand the factors that influence those valuations,
such factors should be introduced separately into the model. Their introduc-
tion is challenging because the added factors are not likely to be independent
of each other, and there may be unknown disturbing factors that cannot be
taken into account. This marks the problem of reversing the ceteris absentibus
and neglectis conditions. However, the economist can render such recompo-
sitional issues into statistical measurement problems, interrogating the extent
to which the variation in unknown variables accounts for the measured dif-
ferences in utility valuations. In this way, economists will gain further infor-
mation about what has been left out via what are called the ‘residuals’ in such
a measurement equation. Such residuals can often be very illuminating about
missing factors or the forms given for those included factors, and this kind
of learning from recomposing has long been a standard practice in economet-
rics (the statistical branch of economics). Similarly, in discussing earth sci-
ences, Miyake (2015) has recently related the use of residuals to what he calls
‘active’ deidealization: the generation of new observations through the com-
parison of the actual observations with predictions of simple and “false” ref-
erence models.
Situating.—Before QUALYS can be used in decisions by individuals,
health providers, and payers to decide on actions that will affect individuals
with a certain condition (e.g., kidney dialysis or hip replacements), the model
and measurements of utility have to be situated for that group of people and
their particular decisions. This situating could concern patients thinking about
the impact of a particular or alternative treatments, but it could also result in
a decision model for health service providers who aim to compare costs of
treating alternative conditions in view of their gain for patients as a group.This content downloaded from 158.143.237.079 on September 30, 2019 03:34:33 AM
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basis of survey data from a set of patients and the specific costs of different treat-
ments. For treatment decisions at the system level, the model will also need
to be shaped and adjusted for specific country and institutional health ser-
vice system (e.g., a national health insurance–based system vs. a private
health care system).
Our four categories—recomposing, reformulating, concretizing, and sit-
uating, fleshed out above—provide a framework for analyzing deidealization.
Other kinds of generic processes or finer-grained distinctions are surely pos-
sible. But these categories do offer a menu of processes of deidealization that
can be applied to a model according to the purposes at hand. It is important
to note, moreover, that this array of deidealization strategies is in many cases
independent from any original idealizing strategies or purposes of the ideal-
ized model. Model users deidealize in view of their aims in particular the-
oretical and practical contexts, and such processes likely involve different com-
binations of deidealizing strategies.
The deidealizing menu along with our economic examples show how
problematic the notion of deidealization as a set of reversals can be. The prob-
lems do not only boil down to our limited knowledge concerning the omitted
factors or practical problems concerning tractability (admittedly often de-
manding); they are more endemic in nature. Examining the range of details
posed by the four kinds of deidealizing processes showed that there is no easy
‘adding back’ or ‘correcting’ for previous idealizations. And just as there are
no easy reversals, nor are there self-evident movements between the more or
less idealized state of a model—the idea (spelled out by Nowak 1992, 2000)
that scientists can go up and down the ladder from idealized to less idealized
and back again. And, consequently, there is no precise way to talk about the
degree of (de)idealization either (cf. Levy 2018). Deidealization as a reversal
is clearly an idealization of its own.
4. Modeling Reconsidered. The starting point of our article was to exam-
ine how the philosophical discussion on idealization crucially makes use of
the idea of deidealization, while at the same time leaving that notion largely
unarticulated and unexamined. We suggested that this neglect can be ex-
plained by the implicit assumption that deidealization amounts to a reversal
of the idealizing process. In our analysis of deidealization, we did not begin
from the notion of reversal and so not from that of idealization either. Rather,
we set out to study the actual processes of deidealization. But the focus on
the theoretical and practical challenges of deidealization also proves illumi-
native of modeling.
Our analysis of deidealization processes opens up two critical perspectives
on modeling that largely remain hidden when only the processes of idealiza-
tion are considered. The first concerns decomposability of models, and theThis content downloaded from 158.143.237.079 on September 30, 2019 03:34:33 AM
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tific practice.
Thinking seriously about the practices and processes of deidealization
leads us to ask to what extent models can be considered as entities whose
parts can be teased apart from each other and edited, or corrected, as the re-
versal account would have it. The notion of deidealization as a reversal of
idealization seems to require that models are composed of separable assump-
tions or components, enabling theorists to deidealize such components in a
selective, controlled fashion. Furthermore, our knowledge of the bits and pieces
of the real world could then be, at least in principle, mapped onto a model in
a relatively unproblematic way (and vice versa). In other words, the idea of
reversing step by step the idealizations made in the modeling process pre-
supposes that models are decomposable. This seems to be a generally held
view of philosophical writings on modeling and idealization.9 Yet the prob-
lems encountered by robustness analysis show that this may not often be the
case (Odenbaugh and Alexandrova 2011). Of course, minimalist idealization
does not need to rely for its explanatory value on deidealization. However,
the causal difference-making variant of minimalist idealization seems to be
based on the decomposability assumption concerning models, supposing,
moreover, that the world is causally modular, enabling the analyst to separate
the difference-making causal factors from non-difference-making irrelevant
ones.
But our analysis of the processes of recomposing and reformulating sug-
gest that models are relatively inflexible to changes in their contents in many
different respects. Just as an experimental protocol needs to keep the experi-
ment shielded for it to work, so too in reasoning with models. It may not be
possible to add back in certain causal factors without consequences, as these
factors are related to others the scientist also wants to keep in the model. And
the representing issues inherent in the deidealization processes show that a
model may not be decomposable in another more serious sense—if the model
consists of the integration or the molding of various elements together, then
it may not be possible to tease those elements apart without collapsing the
functionality of the model. In short, models may not be robust to many kinds
of deidealization.
Our second point concerns modeling heuristics. We espy, in the usual as-
sumptions concerning idealization combined with the associated neglect of
deidealization problems, an insidious presumption by philosophers of sci-
ence that scientists originally start from considering the real world and then
arrive at their models through idealizing (and abstracting). And because that9. See, however, Rice (2019) for a critique of the presumption that models could be de-
composable into contributions made by their different parts.
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scientists can reverse their modeling recipes to get back down to the more fully
blown situation they started with, fraught though that process might be. But
many of the challenges we discussed stem from the fact that scientists did
not start with a complex picture, simplifying it to get to idealized tractable
models. As we know from other studies of modeling, scientists often begin
with something that is already simple and abstract in content and based around
some conceptual elements that they believe underlie the phenomena they
want to model (Morgan 2012; Knuuttila and Loettgers 2016). That is, they
often begin with an idealized simple model, not with processes of idealization
to get to that model. This critical hidden point lies behind many of the chal-
lenges of deidealization outlined in the article.
If, and when, scientists start with already simple abstract models, one of
the main challenges of deidealizing arises from filling in the set of unknown
elements, concretizing and situating the concepts, and being able to render
them into a representable form. These are ceteris paribus conditions of vari-
ous kinds, assumptions related to mathematical tractability, assumptions about
what is most relevant, challenges of definitional and conceptual content, and
so on. Many of these assumptions might not be spelled out because they are
taken for granted by those in the community working with that group of mod-
els; typically only some of them are articulated. Moreover, as far as scientific
practice goes, models are not well defined by a set of assumptions that lie be-
hind them, nor are they only derived from them in some determinate manner.
They can rather be conceived as freestanding artifacts (Knuuttila 2011, 2017)
with a degree of autonomy from both theory and data regimes (Morrison and
Morgan 1999). And they may be constructed in various ways—through anal-
ogy and template transfer, through putting together a list of ingredients in view
of some theoretical goals, or through the use of theoretical imagination (Mor-
gan 2012). None of these standard ways of model construction starts only with
a set of assumptions in order to derive a model.
It is important to realize, then, that although models appear simple, they
may not in fact be so because they were suitably simplified in the modeling
process, but rather it is because they were chosen from the start to be ideal
and abstract in certain ways. That models often ‘start seemingly simple’ has
important consequences for deidealization. The challenges of deidealization
we studied are generic and separable in principle, yet their difficulties may be
compounded when a model is not made by any explicit process of idealization
but rather a scientist has started with a simple or ideal hypothesis in model
form, possibly making use of some familiar model template. This also means
that even simple models are much more problematic objects than philoso-
phers have noticed. They are more inflexible than the reversal thesis would
have us believe, and so deidealization emerges to be as creative a part of mod-
eling as any other dimension of it.This content downloaded from 158.143.237.079 on September 30, 2019 03:34:33 AM
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